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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of socially responsible investing has increased rapidly over the past two 
decades as the investors are demanding such practices and the company’s ecological, 
social and governance issues are capturing more media coverage. The purpose of this 
thesis is to study the effect of company’s ESG disclosure score on its performance. ESG 
disclosure score measures the amount of information disclosed by company on 
ecological, social and governance issues.  
 
Thesis is conducted using a data of daily stock returns from Finnish stock exchange 
between the years 2006 and 2016. Companies from Helsinki stock exchange are divided 
into two equally-weighted portfolios using ESG disclosure score provided by Bloomberg 
as a divider. ESG portfolio includes companies that disclose some of the ESG information 
while non-ESG portfolio includes company with no ESG disclosure score. The portfolios 
are rebalanced after each year based on the changes in ESG disclosure score.  
 
Results suggest that the usage of company’s ESG disclosure score as an investment screen 
does not lead to a significant over or underperformance. Furthermore, neither of the 
sample portfolios are able to create positive alphas during the sample period. Difference 
between the performances of the two portfolios are explained through exposure to market 
risk. The performance of the sample portfolios is also tested against different market 
conditions by dividing the sample period into crisis and non-crisis periods. Evidence from 
the thesis indicates that ESG portfolio generates positive alphas during the non-crisis 
period and negative alphas during market turmoil while the opposite is true for the non-
ESG portfolio. While the portfolios are able to generate positive alphas during different 
market conditions, neither are statistically significant. Furthermore, evidence from the 
analysis of different market conditions indicate that non-ESG portfolio includes more 
defensive stocks as it is able to create positive alphas during market crisis period.   
 
 
KEYWORDS: Socially responsible investing, ESG, Portfolio performance  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and is evidently not the 
good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else” (Aristotle 
350 B.C.).1 
 
Textbooks in economics and finance often state that investor’s behavior is driven and 
based on the maximization of self-interest. However, several studies indicate that there 
are variety of alternative motives driving investor behavior (Fehr et al. 2000; Bovenberg 
2002). Bovenberg (2002) argues that the behavior of corporate stakeholders such as 
consumers and shareholders may influence corporations to take public goods, for 
example, environment, into more consideration even if this does not have a direct benefit 
for the corporations. Additionally, Beal, Goyen & Phillips (2005) name non-wealth 
returns and contribution to social change as an alternative reasons for investors besides 
achieving superior financial returns, stating that investors are willing to pay extra for 
ethical options. However, a belief that choosing socially responsible firms to investment 
portfolio or leaving out stocks that are morally dubious or unethical, will generate 
superior returns, is the number one motivation behind investing responsibly (Beal et al. 
2005).  
 
Using different social and ethical screens or taking corporation’s governance issues into 
consideration while doing investment decisions falls under the category of socially 
responsible investment, SRI. The popularity of SRI has grown exponentially over the past 
two decades amongst individual investors, which, in part, has increased the number of 
SRI funds available. Report conducted by the Forum of Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment (2012) states that the total net asset value of socially responsible investment 
funds exceeded 1,000 billion dollars in 2012 while the number was 12 billion in 1995. As 
the industry of socially responsible investments is growing rapidly, academic researched 
has followed. The performance measurements of socially responsible investing have been 
thoroughly investigated in academic research from various perspectives. Most studies 
focus on the performance of SRI funds but research on the stock level has also been 
conducted including the opposite side of the coin of socially responsible investing, sin 
stocks. Conclusive evidence on the effects of SRI on fund performance has yet to be 
made. Various studies find that the performance of SRI funds is not significantly different 
                                                 
 
1 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (2010). 
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from conventional funds (Hamilton, Jo & Statman 1993; Goldreyer & Diltz 1999; Bello 
2005). 
 
In contrast to the research stating that using different socially responsible screens has no 
statistically significant impact on portfolio performance, several studies document results 
that using criteria that narrows the investment universe will cause the portfolio to 
underperform and limit its diversification (Diltz 1995; Grossman & Sharpe 1986; Hall 
1986). In addition, according to Rudd (1981), the portfolio performance will suffer 
through socially responsible investing because restraining companies will create size and 
other biases, hence affecting the long-term performance. Most of the previous research 
on socially responsible investing conclude that the differences between SRI funds and 
conventional funds are statistically insignificant or skew on conventional funds’ favor. 
However, there are several studies that document the outperformance of SRI funds. 
Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Koedijk (2005) state that using SRI-related screens leads to 
an outperformance that is statistically significant. Additionally, Bauer, Koedijk & Otten 
(2005) found similar results on the outperformance achieved by ranking companies on 
their eco-efficiency rating. Bauer et al. (2005) state that companies with higher rating 
performed significantly better than low-ranked companies.  
 
It is easy to conclude that the research on the performance of socially responsible 
investing is ambiguous at best. One possible reason behind the elusiveness of the results 
is the different methodology used in the studies. The performance measurements vary 
from using capital asset pricing model and Jensen’s alpha (Hamilton, Jo & Statman 1993) 
to more advanced methods such as Carthart’s (1997) four factor model (Bauer et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, substantial part of research is conducted using individual countries and 
relatively small sample periods which makes international comparison of SRI 
performance more difficult (Renneboog, Horst & Zhang 2008). Regardless of differences 
in methods and sample periods, SRI is an interesting, relatively fresh and rapidly growing 
part of modern finance offering a number of topics for further research.  
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of ESG screen on portfolio performance. 
The study aims to make a contribution to the existing literature on socially responsible 
investments by studying the effect of ESG disclosure score on portfolio performance. 
ESG disclosure score measures the amount of information covered by companies on 
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ecological, social and governance issues. The score varies between 0 (no information 
covered) and 100 (all the possible information covered) and it is maintained by 
Bloomberg. Furthermore, the study contributes to the existing literature by expanding the 
data to post financial crisis period and measuring the impact of different market 
conditions on the performance of socially responsible investment strategy. As most of the 
previous research is conducted using data from United States or other larger economies, 
the study seeks to provide different perspective by using data from Finnish stock market, 
hence contributing to the research already conducted in the University of Vaasa.   
 
In addition to the research contribution, the purpose of the study is to offer thorough 
review on the previous literature and research on socially responsible investing by 
covering the main results and contributions. Additionally, the purpose of the thesis is to 
analyze the results and to combine it with the existing literature. 
 
 
1.2. Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses of the study are derived from the existing research in socially responsible 
investments. As mentioned above, most of the studies find that using ESG screens will 
cause funds to underperform or the effect is statistically insignificant. Only few studies 
document positive effects on the performance. First hypothesis of the thesis is derived 
from the basis that screens on ecological, social and governance issues have negative 
impact on portfolio performance. Hypothesis is based on the work of Girard, Rahman and 
Stone (2007) where they investigate the total cost of social constrains in investment 
decision.  
 
H1: Using ESG disclosure score as a screen has a negative impact on portfolio 
performance. 
 
Second hypothesis takes the performance measurements further and seeks to analyze the 
differences between portfolios conducted using Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure score as a 
differentiator. The motivation behind second hypothesis is from the research of 
Renneboog et al. (2008) where they investigate the performance of socially responsible 
investment funds. Renneboog et al. (2008) hypothesize that consideration of ethical, 
social and governance issues in investment decisions influence the stock price leading 
investors to pay the price for using SRI screens. Additionally, Renneboog et al. (2008) 
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find that SRI funds underperform their benchmark portfolios in most of the developed 
countries such as United States and United Kingdom.   
 
H2: Companies with no ESG disclosure score outperform their socially responsible 
counterparts. 
 
The third hypothesis is based on the work of Nofsinger et al. (2014) where they state that 
socially responsible mutual funds outperform conventional funds during market turmoil 
but underperform during non-crisis periods. The third hypothesis is tested by dividing the 
sample period in crisis and non-crisis periods and it goes as follows: 
 
H3: ESG portfolio outperforms the non-ESG portfolio during market crisis periods.   
 
The three hypotheses are tested using research methodology from the study conducted by 
Schröder (2007). The results are then analyzed and discussed in length using above-
mentioned research as a baseline. 
 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The study is formed in the following manner. Second chapter covers the SRI as a concept 
by going through its history and presenting alternative socially responsible investment 
strategies. Also the concept of ‘Sin stock’ is visited briefly. Third chapter concentrates 
on the theoretical background the study is based on. Efficient market hypothesis is 
explained and portfolio performance measures are introduced. Fourth chapter goes 
through the previous literature in length by introducing the main results on SRI focusing 
on the performance measures between conventional and SRI funds. Fifth chapter 
introduces the data used in the thesis and presents key figures related to the ESG 
disclosure score. Sixth chapter reveals the methodology behind the research and chapter 
seven goes through the main results and discussion. The eight and last chapter 
summarizes the main results and gives the main conclusions.  
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
 
Socially responsible investing or SRI is increasingly popular amongst individual 
investors and funds using SRI criteria as an investment tool are growing rapidly. USSIF 
Foundation (2014) reports that only in the United States, more than $ 6.57 trillion dollars 
were invested using SRI strategies. This is more than every sixth dollar under professional 
management in the United States by the end of 2014. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
development of SRI assets in billions of dollars in the United States between the years 
1995 and 2012. In addition, the growth rate of assets under management increased over 
76 per cent between 2012 and 2014 rising from $3.74 trillion to $6.57 trillion. (USSIF 
2014.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. SRI in the United States in 1995 – 2012 (USSIF 2012). 
 
 
Nofsinger & Varma (2013) state that one of the main reasons behind the rapid growth of 
SRI-based investment strategies is the individual investor’s demand for such practices. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the growth and popularity of ESG criteria in investment funds 
which is strongly related to the requirements of the individual investors. Figure shows the 
number of investment funds using ESG criteria have increased from 55 in 1995 to 720 in 
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2012. The net asset value of these funds has grown from $12 billion to $1,013 billion in 
the same period. (USSIF 2014.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Investment funds incorporating ESG criteria in investment decisions (USSIF 2012).   
 
 
There are two main motivations behind socially responsible investing. First, the need of 
an investment strategy that is in line with the personal values, is increasingly popular 
among investors. This type of investment strategy is often called ‘feel good’ investing 
and it makes investors feel better about themselves. Another motivational factor behind 
investing responsibly is the investor’s need to make investments that improve quality of 
life. These type of investors put their money into strategies that are driven by the goal of 
social change. (Schueth 2003.) Other reasons behind the increasing popularity of socially 
responsible investing strategies are strong financial performance, creating environmental 
benefits, managing risk and preparing for future challenges (USSIF 2014). 
 
There are number of motivational reasons behind socially responsible investing but why 
has it grown so rapidly in the past two decades? Schueth (2003) argues that the growing 
popularity of SRI is due to a number of reasons. One of the most important factors 
contributing to the growing popularity of SRI is information. Nowadays, investors are 
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Figure 2. Investment funds incorporating ESG criteria in investment decisions (USSIF 2012). 
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better educated and social research organizations are capable of producing high quality 
information for investors that may affect their investment decisions. Investors tend to 
make more responsible decision when they are better informed. Another reason for 
socially responsible investing to grow more rapidly in recent years is the increasing 
number of women involved in the finance industry. Approximately 60 per cent of socially 
conscious investors are women. In addition, women do not only contribute to the socially 
responsible investing through their investment decisions but also because increasing 
number of women are joining the workforce, MBA programs and board of directors etc. 
The third reason contributing to the increase of SRI is the fact that investors do not 
automatically need to sacrifice the performance when investing responsibly. Academic 
research and the performance of the SR funds have partially broken the myth that socially 
responsible investing will underperform compared to conventional investment strategies. 
Growing belief exists amongst socially responsible investors that responsibility and 
prosperity are not mutually exclusive. (Schueth 2003.) 
 
More concrete evidence of the growing importance of socially responsible investing is 
the foundation of the Principles for Responsible Investment. The PRI was founded by the 
United Nations in 2005 to help investors use responsible investments to enhance returns 
and managing risks. PRI is created by a group of institutional investors worldwide to 
encourage its signatories to invest through responsible principles. PRI has launched six 
core principles and by implementing them to the investment decisions, investors help to 
create more sustainable global financial system. (Principles of Responsible Investment 
2016.) 
 
1. Incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
2. Be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. 
3. Seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
4. Promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment 
industry. 
5. Work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
6. Report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles. 
 
The PRI has grown rapidly since its launch in 2005. Figure 3 demonstrates the growth of 
PRI from 2006 to 2016. The number of signatories who have signed to follow the 
principles of responsible investing has grown from 100 to 1 500 in a ten year period. 
Furthermore, the asset under management has increased from 7 to 62 US$ trillion in the 
same time period. (Principles of Responsible Investment 2016.) 
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Figure 3. The growth of PRI during the time period of 2006-2016 (Priciples of Responsiple Investment). 
 
 
The terminology behind SRI is ambiguous and dependable on the approach to the socially 
responsible investing. Terms community investing, ethical investing, green investing, 
impact investing, mission-related investing etc. are all used to describe SRI from a 
different perspectives.  
 
 
2.1. History of Socially Responsible Investing 
 
The origins of the SRI dates back in the early stages of civilization. Jewish law defined 
numerous directives of how to invest ethically. Since then, for generations, religious 
investors driven by the prospect of peace and prosperity have avoided investing in 
enterprises linked to killing or enslaving humans. In modern times, these once religious 
traditions can be seen in the form of avoiding the so called ‘sin stocks’. Sin stock is a 
stock that is related to morally suspicious industries such as gaming, alcohol or tobacco. 
(Schueth 2003.)  
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The modern roots of SRI are political. In the 1960s, social responsibility and 
accountability was a major concern among public in the United States. This was caused 
by number of political aspects such as Vietnam War, civil rights, inequality between men 
and women and the nuclear concerns from 1970s. However, the number of socially 
responsible investors did not grow rapidly until the 1980s when the racist system of 
apartheid was widely pressured by different institutions such as cities, states, universities 
and individual investors. These issues backed with the growing knowledge of dangers 
related to global warming and ozone depletion are the reasons behind the increasing 
popularity of socially responsible investment strategies. (Schueth 2003.)  
 
 
2.3. SRI Strategies 
 
According to Schueth (2003), SRI can be divided into three main strategies: screening, 
shareholder advocacy and community investing.  Within these strategies, socially responsible 
investors try to integrate their personal values and concerns of society into investment 
decision (Schueth 2003).  
 
2.3.1. Screening 
 
Screening is based on a strategy where investors are including or excluding companies 
from their portfolios using criteria that are socially responsible. Main objective is to find 
profitable companies that are following socially responsible principles and are beneficial 
to society. This requires investors to perform thorough analysis of company’s corporate 
policies, overall practices and various other criteria to find out if the company is socially 
responsible. This packed with the analysis of company’s profit potential creates the so 
called double bottom line analysis. This type of analysis often creates portfolios that 
include companies which have good employer-employee relations and respect towards 
environment and human rights. Companies with harmful business incentives are avoided. 
Screening strategy tries to seek the well-managed companies from social perspective 
keeping in mind that perfect companies do not exist. Main objective is to create a portfolio 
that satisfies both investor’s financial goals and social criteria. (Schueth 2003.) 
 
Socially responsible investors using screens often accept that avoiding companies do not 
affect the stock prices directly except in extreme situations where, for some reason, the 
divestment becomes comprehensive in nature. In addition, sometimes social screens are 
used to avoid conflict of interests. Social investors avoid certain companies or industries 
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that contradict with the investor’s mission, values or principles. For example, it would be 
unethical for healthcare related institutions to invest in tobacco industry or for religious 
organizations to buy shares related to weapon industry. (Smith 2005.) 
 
2.3.2. Shareholder Advocacy 
 
As a shareholder, socially responsible investor sometimes raises concern of company’s 
environmental and social issues. This is done by voting and trying to engage on 
company’s decision making process. This strategy is called shareholder advocacy and 
investors practicing it believe that social awareness in corporate behavior will improve 
company’s financial performance. (Schueth 2003.) 
 
The main tool for investors using shareholder advocacy as an investment strategy is the 
proxy resolution. Shareholder resolution gives investors a right to demand information or 
affect company policies. Shareholder resolution is an effective tool for investors to 
communicate and interact with the company management and other investors with the 
same investment objectives. There are two main motivations for socially responsible 
investors to interact with the company through shareholder resolution process. (Smith 
2005.) 
 
1. Companies adopting responsible social and governance practices will secure the long-
term share owner value. 
2. Investors have right and responsibility to interact with the company management and 
board to guide the company policies towards the long-term interest of the investors. 
 
Socially responsible investors using shareholder advocacy are more concerned about the 
long term value of the company than its quarterly earnings. Company management and 
board of directors are facing increasing pressure about their ecological, social and 
governance practices from shareholders who are concerned of the long term value of their 
investment. (Smith 2005.) 
 
2.3.3. Community Investing 
 
Community investing is based on an idea of funding people in low-income communities 
that have problems accessing markets through conventional channels. This type of 
socially responsible investing mainly focuses on providing housing and developing small 
businesses in at-risk communities. (Schueth 2003.) 
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Social investors engaging in community investing often seek opportunities to invest 
directly to poor communities by buying a certificate of deposit from a bank specialized 
in community development. In addition, socially responsible investors can influence and 
fund low-income areas by extending loans in community development loan funds or by 
making market rate investments in housing of poor areas. (Smith 2005.) 
 
 
2.4. Sin stocks 
 
At the opposite end of the investment universe lie the sin stocks. Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) define sin stocks as publicly traded companies involved in producing tobacco, 
alcohol and gambling. These three industries are often called the triumvirate of sin 
because of their tendencies to cause addiction and undesirable social consequences (Hong 
et al. 2009). 
 
Sin stocks are considered socially unacceptable and therefore their prices could be 
influenced by the social norms. Hong et al. (2009) provide evidence that socially 
responsible investing can affect stock prices. The screening strategies of large 
institutional investors have an impact on sin stocks. By shunning controversial stocks 
from their investment portfolios, investors are affecting the cost of capital of such 
companies. (Hong et al. 2009.) Hong et al. (2009) state that social norms and constraints, 
especially for institutional investors, can cause them to suffer financial losses by avoiding 
to fund companies related to vice. Willingness to accept financial losses by avoiding sin 
companies tells the growing importance of socially responsible investing. The 
performance differences between sin stocks and socially responsible firms has awoken 
the interest of academic research. Soler-Dominguez and Matallin-Saez (2015) investigate 
the performance differences between socially responsible mutual funds and the morally 
controversial VICEX fund. Soler-Dominiguez et al. (2015) state that VICEX fund 
outperforms socially responsible mutual funds during the periods of market expansion 
but underperforms during market crisis periods. Additionally, Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant 
(2008) document positive excess returns for portfolio constructed from companies in sin 
industries worldwide. One possible reasons behind excess returns is the economic gain 
from not having to maintain high standards in responsibility towards society. Another 
reason behind outperforming the market index comes from the notion that sin stocks are 
undervalue due to a negative attitudes from certain investor groups. (Fabozzi et al. 2008.) 
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In contrast to a research of Hong et al. (2009), the sin stocks are often understood in a 
broader since than only the triumvirate of sin covering alcohol, tobacco and gambling 
industries. In addition to these industries, Fabozzi et al. (2008) list industries that can be 
considered as controversial. Table 1 demonstrates the number of companies and the so 
called sin industries of 21 countries during the time period from 1970 to 2007.  
 
 
Table 1. Number of sin companies and industries by country, 1970-2007 (Fabozzi et al. 2008). 
Country Companies Industry Companies 
Australia 38 Adult services 22 
Belgium 5 Alcohol 118 
Canada 7 Weapons 21 
Denmark 3 Gaming 106 
Finland 3 Biotech 19 
France 25 Tobacco 22 
Germany 5 
  
Hong Kong 8 
  
Italy 5 
  
Japan 41 
  
Korea 15 
  
Netherlands 5 
  
Norway 3 
  
Portugal 3 
  
Singapore 3 
  
Spain 6 
  
Sweden 6 
  
Switzerland 2 
  
Taiwan 1 
  
United Kingdom 48 
  
United States 76 
  
Total 308   308 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to cover the theoretical background used in the thesis. 
Chapter introduces the theoretical framework of efficient market and seeks to connect it 
with the theory behind socially responsible investing by going through existing literature 
and methodology. 
 
 
3.1. Efficient market hypothesis 
 
The theory of efficient market is based on an assumption that prices of securities fully 
reflect all the available information. However, the efficiency of market can be divided 
into three different categories based on its effectiveness: strong form, semi-strong form 
and weak form of efficiency. When the market performs weakly, the prices of the 
securities only reflect the past returns. Weak form of market efficiency is based on the 
random walk literature which suggests that the movements of security prices could not 
be predicted because they are believed to move randomly. The semi-strong form of 
market efficiency is based on an assumption that prices of securities also reflect the 
information that is publicly available for all the investors, such as earnings 
announcements, stock splits or other corporate actions. The situation where prices of 
securities reflect all the available information, containing both public and non-public 
information, is called the strong form of market efficiency. Non-public information can 
be defined as investor’s knowledge of a certain company that is not reflected on its price, 
also known as the insider information. (Fama 1970.)  
 
Since the 1970’s the theory of market efficiency has been thoroughly researched and 
contributions have been made to develop the theory further. Fama (1991) contributes to 
his original theory by altering the forms of efficient market. Weak form of market 
efficiency, which is related to the forecasting power of past returns, is modified to cover 
return predictability in wider sense. In addition to past returns, variables such as dividend 
yields and interest rates are included in forecasting price movements. Additionally, return 
predictability includes cross-sectional analysis covering asset-pricing models and the 
effect of anomalies such as size and January effect. (Fama 1991.) 
 
Fama (1991) suggests that semi-strong form and strong form of efficiency are to be called 
as event studies and tests for private information respectively. Event studies have become 
essential part of modern finance, particularly corporate finance. The purpose of the event 
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studies related to market efficiency is to study the effect of investment or financing 
decision on share prices whereas tests for private information investigate the usage of 
insider information and its effect on stock prices. (Fama 1991.) 
 
3.1.1. Measuring market efficiency 
 
The efficiency of capital markets can be measured with different asset pricing models. 
Two commonly known models determining the expected return of a security are 
presented below: Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Fama-French three-factor 
model.  
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model was created in 1960’s and it is still widely used model 
in the field of finance. CAPM is built on the work of Harry Markowitz (1952) assuming 
that investors are risk averse choosing only mean-variance efficient portfolios. Hence, the 
theory created by Markowitz is often called the mean variance model. (Fama & French 
(2004.) CAPM is based on an assumption that the expected rate of return for security can 
be calculated as follows: 
 
(1)   E(Ri) = Rf + βi x [E(Rm) – Rf] 
 
Where E(Ri) is the expected return of security i, Rf is the risk free rate, β is the beta of the 
security i and E(Rm) is the expected market return. (Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey 1999.) 
 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2003) introduce several simplifying conditions for CAPM to 
hold: 
 
1. No transaction costs or taxes. 
2. All the investors have identical holding period. 
3. Investors behave rationally. 
4. Investors are price-takers acting as the security prices are not affected by their trades. 
5. Investments are limited to publicly traded financial assets. 
6. All the investors have homogenous expectations. 
 
Even though the capital asset pricing model was originally introduced decades ago, it 
has still real life applications such as estimating the firms cost of capital or evaluating 
the performance of a portfolio (Fama et al. 2004). 
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Fama and French (1993) propose an alternative model where the price of a security 
depends on the sensitivity of its return to market movements and two other portfolios 
replicating additional risk factors. This model is called the three-factor model:  
 
(2)  Rit = αi + βiMRMt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + εit, 
 
where Rm is the market return. SMB describes the return of a portfolio containing small 
stocks in excess of a portfolio containing large stocks. In addition, HML describes the 
return of portfolio containing stocks with high B/M ratios in excess of return of portfolio 
containing stocks with low B/M ratios. SMB and HML characteristics are included in the 
three factor model because firm size and book-to-market ratios seem to have predictive 
power on average stock returns. (Fama et al. 1993.) 
 
Fama and French (2015) contribute to their original theory of three common risk factors 
by adding two more to better explain the cross-section of stock returns: profitability 
(RMW) and investment patterns (CMA). RMW describes the difference in returns of 
diversified portfolios with strong and weak profitability. CMA measures the difference 
between returns of diversified portfolios of stocks that invest conservatively and stocks 
that invest aggressively. (Fama et al. 2015.) 
 
 
3.2. Portfolio theory 
 
Modern portfolio theory is based on the research of Harry Markowitz (1952). The 
Markowitz Portfolio Selection Model suggests that the first step for portfolio optimization 
is to identify the risk-return opportunities from the minimum-variance frontier of risky 
assets. Figure 4 demonstrates the efficient frontier. Minimum-variance frontier of risky 
assets is a graph indicating the lowest possible variance available for a given expected 
portfolio return. Upon portfolio construction, when short-selling is allowed, all the 
individual assets lie on the right side of the efficient frontier indicating that single-asset 
portfolios are inefficient. As a conclusion, figure 4 provides evidence that investment 
diversification leads to higher expected return and lower standard deviation. All the 
portfolios from the minimum-variance frontier and above the global minimum-variance 
portfolio can be characterized as possible optimal portfolios. (Bodie et al. 2003: 223 - 226.) 
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The second part for Markowitz’s portfolio theory is the inclusion of risk-free assets. 
Figure 5 provides the optimal capital allocation line, which is the steepest slope on the 
efficient frontier. Point P from the figure demonstrates the optimal risky portfolio as it is 
the tangent to the efficient frontier. Finally, the investor will choose the desired allocation 
between the optimal portfolio and the risk-free assets. (Bodie et al. 2003: 226 - 227.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The minimum-variance frontier of risky assets (Bodie et al. 2003) 
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3.3. Socially responsible investing 
 
Conventional finance theory dictates that individual investors are characterized as 
rational when making investment decisions. This means that traditional finance theory 
does not identify the personal value or preferences when it comes to investment decision. 
If this holds, socially responsible investing would exists only because it provides 
equivalent returns at lower risk or higher returns for the same amount of risk. However, 
number of studies suggests that investors do not behave the way traditional finance theory 
typically assumes.  It is well documented in the past decades that investors do not behave 
rationally in every situation. (Beal et al. 2005.) 
 
There are number of examples of irrational investor behavior. Few examples of such 
occasions are overconfidence in trading, anchoring and framing. Overconfidence in 
trading refers to a situation where net returns decrease as trading increases and that men 
trade 45 per cent more than women (Odean 1998). Anchoring refers to a human behavior 
on a quantitative assessment and how it can be influenced by making irrelevant 
suggestions (Tversky & Kahneman 1973). Framing is related to the way the question or 
proposition is presented. It is well documented that framing can change the decision 
making process. (Slovic 1995.) Shefrin & Statman (1985) contribute to literature of 
investor’s irrational behavior by stating that cognitive biases and emotions can affect 
Figure 5. The efficient frontier of risky assets with optimal capital allocation line (Bodie et al. 2003) 
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investor’s decision making. Shefrin et al. (1985) state that investors see their investments 
as individual stocks rather than portfolio which makes it hard for them to realize losses. 
 
Beal et al. (2005) list three main reasons investors invest ethically: superior financial 
returns, non-wealth returns and contribution to social change. Generating superior returns 
while investing ethically is the main motivational driver that conventional finance theory 
supports. However, there are number of studies investigating the link between firm’s 
financial performance and responsibility but conclusive evidence that investing 
responsibly would generate superior returns has yet to be made. Beal et al. (2005) argue 
that non-wealth returns are one reason for socially responsible investing. Some investors 
identify the need to include additional goal in their investment decision: willingness to 
pay extra for ethical options. Finally, Beal et al. (2005) suggests one alternative 
motivation for socially responsible investing, achieving social change. These type of 
investors are investing in companies through which they can benefit the society. (Beal et 
al. 2005.) 
 
A theoretical background for socially responsible investing can be derived from 
investor’s utility function as the conventional finance theory fails to explain why investors 
invest ethically. Figure 6 presents a utility function of an ethical investor making an 
assumption that ethical investor shows some degree of risk aversion. Figure 4 displays an 
investment decision where W0 is the current situation and W2 is the amount of wealth if 
the decision is profitable and W1 if the investment is lost. The utility derived from the 
investment depends on the ethicality of the investment. If the investment is seen as 
unethical, the investor will gain less utility compared to a situation of not investing. For 
this function to hold, it is necessary to assume that the psychic returns gained from ethical 
investing are similar to gambler’s fun of participation. If the above-mentioned holds and 
investor earns more utility from making the ethical investment than avoiding it, the 
expected financial payoff increases through the positive fund of participation. Another 
conclusion than can be drawn from the ethical investor’s utility function is that the 
investors gain more utility from smaller investments than higher. (Beal et al. 2005.) 
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Figure 4. Ethical investor’s utility function (Beal et al. 2005). 
 
 
Another way to theoretically explain the socially responsible investing is to make 
modification to the utility function of modern finance theory: 
 
(3)  U = f (ER, σR), 
 
where ER describes the expected return which has the positive affect to utility and σR 
describes the expected standard deviation, or the risk of an investment with the negative 
influence to utility. To modify the utility function covering the socially responsible 
investing, additional argument has to be made. (Beal et al. 2005.) 
 
(4)  U = f (ER, σR, e)  
 
Degree of ethicalness of the investment (e) is added to the utility function. Modification 
of the utility function will change the indifference curve for investors. Figure 7 
demonstrates the difference in trade-off between the theoretical frameworks of 
conventional financial theory and ethical investing. In conventional finance theory, the 
investor’s indifference curves slope upwards, because for bearing additional risk, 
Figure 6. Ethical investor’s utility function (Beal et al. 2005). 
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investors demand higher returns. However, for ethical investor, indifference curve 
changes to indifference plane showing the trade-offs the investor is willing to make 
between expected return, expected risk and the ethicalness of the investment. (Beal et al. 
2005.) Beal et al. (2005) conclude that requiring financial return from investments is 
necessary for it to be called investing but suggests that there might be a trade-off between 
financial returns and psychic returns for ethical investors. (Beal et al. 2005.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three provided thorough review on the theoretical side of socially responsible 
investing. Upcoming chapters seek to connect theory with practice by introducing 
previous research and by conducting regression-based analysis on the ESG investing and 
thoroughly analyzing the results.   
  
Figure 7. Investor’s indifference curve & indifference plane of ethical investor (Beal et al 2005). 
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4.  PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
This section goes through the results from previous studies on socially responsible 
investing focusing on the financial performance of ethical investments. Numerous studies 
have been conducted about the financial performance of funds using SRI methods as an 
investment tool. The results are somewhat mixed varying from no statistically significant 
performance differences between socially responsible mutual funds and conventional 
mutual funds (Hamilton, Jo & Statman: 1993, Shank, Mannullang & Hill: 2005) to 
positive returns of socially responsible investing (Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Kedijk: 
2005, Derwall, Kedijk & Ter Horst: 2011). The negative performance impacts of SRI 
have also been documented (Adler & Kritzman: 2008, Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang: 
2008).  
 
 
4.1. Positive impact  
 
Derwall et al. (2005) investigated the impact of socially responsible investing in portfolio 
performance focusing on a so called eco-efficiency concept. Eco-efficiency is defined as 
company’s ability to create value compared to the waste it generates. The study was 
conducted by creating two equity portfolios using the eco-efficiency score as a 
differentiator between the portfolios. The study finds that the portfolio with the higher 
eco-efficiency score generates substantially higher average returns indicating that higher 
returns can be achieved using socially responsible investment strategy. (Derwall et al. 
2005.) 
 
The positive relationship between SRI and stock returns have also been documented by 
Derwall et al. (2011). The study indicates that profit-driven investment strategy creates 
positive abnormal returns for SRI stocks, however, only in the short run. Profit-driven 
implementation of socially responsible investing is based on an assumption that investors 
use ‘positive’ screens to pick out the highest ranked stocks on socially responsible criteria 
rather than leaving the worst out (value-oriented SRI). According to Derwall et al. (2011), 
the differentiation between value-oriented and profit-oriented strategies on socially 
responsible investing is important because it helps to explain the evidence why both 
socially responsible and controversial stocks are producing superior returns. Derwall et 
al. (2011) argue that the controversy of both socially responsible and controversial stock 
producing abnormal returns can be explained through two hypothesis: shunned-stock and 
the errors-in-expectation hypothesis. Shunned-stock hypothesis states that value-driven 
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investors are causing the controversial stocks to trade at relatively lower level because 
they refuse to include stocks in their portfolio that are colliding with their personal values.  
Shunned-stock hypothesis relies on the assumption that value-driven investors are 
sufficient in number to affect the supply and demand of the controversial securities. 
Through above-mentioned mechanism, it is possible for stocks that are avoided by value-
driven socially responsible investors to become mispriced and produce positive abnormal 
returns. In addition, the-errors-in-expectation hypothesis states that the reason socially 
responsible investing can create superior performance stems from the reason that the 
market does not value corporate socially responsibility’s (CSR) ability to positively affect 
the future cash flows of the company. According to Derwall et al. (2011), sometimes 
these two hypothesis can cancel out each other causing the “no net-effect” to occur. This 
could be the case for example when mutual fund using SRI criteria implement screens 
based on these two hypothesis. (Derwall et al. 2011.) 
 
Bauer et al. (2005) investigate the performance of ethical mutual funds compared to 
conventional funds in Germany, United States and United Kingdom during the time-
period from 1990 to 2001. Bauer et al. (2005) state that socially responsible mutual funds 
went through a so called ‘catching-up’ phase as they underperformed significantly during 
early 1990’s but were able to match the risk-adjusted returns of their conventional 
counterparts during the final third of the sample period from 1998 to 2001. In fact, during 
the last period, ethical mutual funds were able to provide superior risk-adjusted returns 
compared to the conventional mutual funds but alphas were statistically significant in 
only two cases. One possible reason behind the established performance improvements 
is learning because socially responsible mutual fund is relatively new concept. (Bauer et 
al. 2005.) 
 
 
4.2. No significant impact 
 
Hamilton et al. (1993) and Shank et al. (2005) report that socially responsible mutual 
funds do not generate statistically significant excess returns compared to their 
conventional counterparts. Shank et al. (2005) state that the lack of statistically significant 
performance differences between these funds is caused by the notion that market do not 
price the SRI characteristics, at least, in the short run (less than five years). However, 
measuring the ten-year performance of portfolio including eleven most favored firms in 
socially responsible mutual funds, Shank et al. (2005) discovered that the socially 
responsible characteristics were valued by the market in the long run.  
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In addition, it is worth noting that during the sample period, none of the socially 
responsible mutual funds produced statistically significant excess returns. It was only the 
portfolio gathered from firms most favored by the SRMF managers that outperformed the 
market and produced positive and statistically significant Jensen’s alpha. The 
outperformance of individual firms most favored by socially responsible mutual fund 
managers provides interesting implications. It is likely that the disclosure requirements 
for ESG information will grow in the future through increasing public awareness and 
regulation. This, in part, transfers the socially responsible behavior into pricing of the 
securities leading to an increased investments in socially responsible firms. (Shank et al. 
2005.) 
 
While investigating the risk-adjusted returns of equity SRI indexes compared to their 
benchmarks, Schröder (2007) discovered that SRI screening does not lead to excess risk-
adjusted returns nor underperformance. The results are interesting in a sense that using 
screens to reduce the investment universe, should according to portfolio theory, lead to a 
decrease in risk-adjusted returns. The results from the Schröder’s (2007) study indicate 
that there is no additional cost of lower returns when using socially responsible 
investment strategies. In addition, the study reveal that most of the indexes using socially 
responsible screens have higher risk compared to their benchmarks. (Schröder 2007.) 
 
In contrast to the research of Schröder (2007), El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra 
(2011) state that firms with socially responsible practices are valued higher and have 
lower risk. El Ghoul et al. (2011) state that improving company’s employee relations, 
environmental policies and product strategies will reduce company’s cost of equity 
capital.  
 
 
4.3. Negative impact  
 
There are number of studies reporting the negative side of socially responsible investing 
when it comes to generating returns. Girard, Rahman & Stone (2007) investigated the 
total cost of SRI by using monthly returns of 116 socially responsible mutual funds for 
the time period of 1984 to 2003. Girard et al. (2007) compared the selectivity cost, 
diversification cost and market timing ability to benchmark index. They found that 
expense ratios or the size of the socially responsible mutual funds has no significant 
impact on fund’s performance. However, the study suggests that the selectivity cost 
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caused by the socially responsible screens implemented in fund’s securities picking 
process is higher with older funds. The study also suggests that increasing the ethical 
screens of the fund will cause a decrease in the fund’s selectivity and net selectivity. 
(Girard et al. 2007.) 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the results of the socially responsible mutual funds 
selectivity, diversification, net selectivity and market timing.  Funds are broken into three 
different main categories: equity funds, balanced funds and bond funds. The table 
presents clear evidence on selectivity that SRMF are unable to outperform the buy-and-
hold strategy showing negative results in all the categories and time periods. However, 
the results are statistically significant for ‘all funds’ category only in 5 and 10 year time 
periods indicating that socially responsible mutual funds could perform similarly to 
benchmark index for shorter time periods (3 years or less). The table also states that the 
securities picking is hardest for the ethical bond fund managers showing statistically 
significant negative results even on a 3-year time period. (Girard et al. 2007.) 
 
Implementing ethical screens on investment decision increases the cost of diversification. 
Table 2 indicates that the diversification costs are statistically significant in all of the four 
categories for 10-year time period. The results on diversification are negative but not 
statistically significant for shorter time spans. It is also worth noting that the cost of 
diversification is highest for the equity funds and lowest for bond funds. Net selectivity 
describes the combined cost of selectivity and diversification and is used to present the 
total cost of investing in socially responsible mutual funds. Table 2 shows that the net 
selectivity is negative and statistically significant for all the fund categories during the 10 
and 5-year time periods. The results on net selectivity indicate that ethical investors have 
to withstand a significant costs on their investments varying from approximately 7% to 
9% per year. Finally, the table shows that there are no statistically significant results on 
market timing which indicates that socially responsible fund managers have no significant 
ability to gain from the effects of market trends. However, for 10-year time period, all the 
coefficients are negative for market timing giving a weak indications that socially 
responsible mutual funds are influenced by weak active management. (Girard et al. 2007.) 
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Table 2. Median Selectivity, Net Selectivity, Diversification and Market Timing. (Girard et al. 2007). 
    
Span 10 Years   5 Years   3 Years   1 Years 
(# of Months) (121)   (118)   (203)   (228) 
Selectivity                       
All Funds -3.37%** (-2.45)  -3.39%** (-2.05)  -3.59 % (-1.31)  -2.67 % (-0.39) 
Equity Funds -0.72 % (-0.28)  -0.63 % (-0.20)  -1.58 % (-0.29)  -0.76 % (-0.07) 
Balanced Funds -2.74%*** (-2.71)  -1.75 % (-0.59)  -1.72 % (-0.38)  -2.60 % (-0.32) 
Bond Funds -5.60%*** (-12.69)  -5.58%*** (-5.97)  -5.36%*** (-3.92)  -4.91 % (-1.53) 
Diversification                       
All Funds 5.95%*** (-2.95)  5.36%* (-1.7)  4.40 % (-0.87)  4.67 % (-0.48) 
Equity Funds 8.02%*** (-3.95)  7.47 % (-1.61)  6.90 % (-0.94)  7.10 % (-0.55) 
Balanced Funds 6.06%*** (-3.68)  6.15 % (-1.56)  5.79 % (-0.95)  6.49 % (-0.65) 
Bond Funds 1.59%*** (-3.78)  1.54%** (-2.01)  1.70 % (-1.24)  2.07 % (-0.57) 
Net Selectivity                       
All Funds -9.32%*** (-8.04)  -8.75%*** (-3.38)  -8.00%*** (-2.94)  -7.34 % (-1.40) 
Equity Funds -8.74%*** (-3.61)  -8.10%* (-1.90)  -8.49 % (-1.23)  -7.86 % (-0.74) 
Balanced Funds -8.80%*** (-7.68)  -7.89%** (-2.49)  -7.5 l%* (-1.85)  -9.10 % (-1.26) 
Bond Funds -7.19%*** (-12.49)  -7.12%*** (-6.38)  -7.06%*** (-5.24)  -6.9%** (-2.55) 
Market Timing                       
All Funds -0.8 (-1.46)  -0.9 (-0.38)  -0.15 (-0.05)  1.58 (-0.26) 
Equity Funds -0.66 (-0.87)  -0.59 (-0.19)  0.52 (-0.13)  2.6 (-0.29) 
Balanced Funds -1.03 (-1.14)  -1.05 (-0.27)  -0.61 (-0.11)  3.8 (-0.2) 
Bond Funds -0.92 (-0.45)   0.46 (-0.1)   1.03 (-0.16)   1.63 (-0.09) 
Figures of selectivity, diversification cost and net selectivity are per annum. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
 
 
Adler et al. (2008) have also been investigating the cost of socially responsible investing. 
They argue that investors who restrict their stock universe with ethical screens will suffer 
a cost compared to an investor whose security universe is not restricted to socially 
responsible investing. The cost suffered is affected by the investor’s skill, cross-sectional 
dispersion of the universe, the fraction of the restricted universe and number of securities 
in the investment portfolio. (Adler et al. 2008.) 
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Table 3 represents the cost of socially responsible investing for portfolios of 250 stocks. 
The table shows that the cost of socially responsible investing increases with the 
investor’s skill. For example, investor who ranks correctly 60 per cent of the investment 
universe with cross-sectional dispersion similar to S&P 500 (35%) and the fraction of 
excluded securities set up to 30 per cent is likely to give up 2.24 per cent of the portfolio 
value compared to an investor with no restraints. However, if the investor were to rank 
only 54 per cent of the securities correctly, the investor has to give up only 0.87 per cent 
of portfolio value compared to a non-restricted counterpart. (Adler et al. 2008.) 
 
The table also shows that strong relationship exists between the fraction of excluded 
securities and the cost of socially responsible investing: increase in the fraction of 
excluded securities will increase the cost of socially responsible investing. The table also 
suggests that the cost of SRI increases with the cross-sectional dispersion. (Adler et al. 
2008.) 
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Table 3. Cost of socially responsible investing for 250 stock portfolios (Adler et al. 2008). 
  S & P 500 dispersion (35%) 
 Fraction of correct choices 
Fraction of excluded 
securities 50 % 52 % 54 % 56 % 58 % 60 % 
10 % 0.00 % 0.12 % 0.22 % 0.37 % 0.48 % 0.60 % 
20 % -0.02 % 0.25 % 0.53 % 0.79 % 1.05 % 1.32 % 
30 % -0.02 % 0.47 % 0.87 % 1.36 % 1.78 % 2.24 % 
  Fraction of correct choices 
  MSCI EAFE dispersion (39%) 
Fraction of excluded 
securities 50 % 52 % 54 % 56 % 58 % 60 % 
10 % -0.01 % 0.12 % 0.29 % 0.39 % 0.53 % 0.66 % 
20 % 0.01 % 0.27 % 0.58 % 0.87 % 1.19 % 1.47 % 
30 % -0.03 % 0.49 % 0.99 % 1.48 % 2.00 % 2.49 % 
  Fraction of correct choices 
  MSCI World dispersion (44%) 
Fraction of excluded 
securities 50 % 52 % 54 % 56 % 58 % 60 % 
10 % 0.00 % 0.13 % 0.30 % 0.43 % 0.60 % 0.76 % 
20 % -0.02 % 0.33 % 0.66 % 1.01 % 1.34 % 1.70 % 
30 % -0.04 % 0.57 % 1.08 % 1.68 % 2.24 % 2.82 % 
  Fraction of correct choices 
  MSCI ACWI Dispersion (64%) 
Fraction of excluded 
securities 50 % 52 % 54 % 56 % 58 % 60 % 
10 % 0.01 % 0.21 % 0.46 % 0.66 % 0.86 % 1.09 % 
20 % -0.02 % 0.51 % 0.94 % 1.44 % 1.94 % 2.44 % 
30 % -0.01 % 0.75 % 1.64 % 2.41 % 3.28 % 4.13 % 
 
 
Adler et al. (2008) further argue that if the motivation behind owning socially responsible 
companies is that they produce superior returns, that is not socially responsible investing. 
Rather, it is active management strategy to create excess returns. This is inconsistent with 
the definition of socially responsible investing which states that even otherwise attractive 
companies are to be excluded from investor’s portfolio because they are socially 
irresponsible. This definition will create a cost where the exclusion of even one 
controversial company outperforms its socially responsible substitute. (Adler et al. 2008.) 
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5. DATA 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the data used in the thesis. Chapter better 
explains the concept of ESG disclosure score and the method of how it is formulated. In 
addition, chapter five goes through the development of ESG disclosure score in Finland 
using other Nordic countries as a peer group.  
 
 
5.1. Data description 
 
The data consist of ecological, social and governance disclosure scores of companies 
listed in Helsinki stock exchange during the time period of 31.12.2006 - 14.12.2016. ESG 
disclosure score rates the company based on its disclosure of quantitative and policy-
related ESG data. The score is based on more than 120 indicators and the rating scale 
ranges between 0 – 100. The company will get the score of 100 if it is able to cover all 
the ESG-related information measured by Bloomberg. Companies are ranked annually 
based on the information it has disclosed during that year. (Bloomberg 2016.) 
 
Figure 8 presents the number of companies with ESG disclosure score during the time 
period of 2006 to 2015. As it can been seen from figure, the total number of companies 
with ESG score have increased drastically during the sample period. The total number of 
companies with ESG disclosure score in Finland has increased from 19 in 2006 to 59 by 
the end of 2015 increasing over 200%. However, after the number of companies with 
ESG disclosure score doubled in 2007, the increase has been steady up until 2012. After 
the 2012, companies with ESG disclosure score has even decreased.  In addition, figure 
8 presents the number of companies listed on the stock exchange during the same time 
period. It can be seen from the figure that the number of companies listed on the stock 
exchange was affected by the financial crises dropping from 148 at the end of 2007 to 
128 at the end of 2013. After the financial crisis period, the number of listed companies 
has stayed more or less the same. 
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Table 4 summarizes the results presented in the previous figure. Additionally, table 4 
provides comparable information of companies with ESG disclosure score by 
documenting the results from other Nordic stock exchanges. Table clearly indicates the 
increasing popularity amongst companies to disclose their ecological, social and 
governance information.  Table 4 shows that Finland ranks highest during the early stages 
of the sample period. Finland is the only country to have above average number of 
companies with ESG disclosure score every year. However, the differences between 
countries have evened out during the final years of the sample period. Another fact that 
can be drawn from the table is that companies listed in the Denmark’s stock exchange are 
the most reluctant to disclose their social, ecological and governance information. 
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Figure 8. Number of companies with ESG disclosure score during 2006-2015 (Bloomberg). 
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Table 4. The percentage of companies with ESG disclosure score in the Nordic countries (Bloomberg). 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Finland 16.5 % 31.1 % 33.6 % 36.0 % 41.2 % 42.1 % 47.7 % 45.4 % 43.1 % 44.7 % 
Sweden 10.0 % 25.5 % 27.9 % 30.2 % 32.4 % 37.8 % 40.0 % 39.9 % 41.3 % 38.0 % 
Norway 3.4 % 11.8 % 16.6 % 17.2 % 34.6 % 38.1 % 39.5 % 43.5 % 43.3 % 43.9 % 
Denmark 5.7 % 16.8 % 16.9 % 16.8 % 19.0 % 23.7 % 28.4 % 30.1 % 31.8 % 28.3 % 
 
 
However, table 4 only covers the fraction of companies disclosing some information 
related to ESG criteria leaving out the fact of how much information has been covered by 
set company. Table 5 gives better indication about the ESG disclosure score by showing 
how much information has been disclosed by companies on average during each year of 
the sample period. Even though the number of companies with ESG disclosure score has 
increased during the sample period, it seems that the average score has been more or less 
the same. However, the table indicates that there has been steady development on the 
average scores of Finnish companies rising from the 30.75 in 2006 to 41.32 at the end of 
2015. Companies listed on the stock exchanges of Denmark and Norway have the lowest 
average scores. Another conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that the highest 
scores vary significantly between the countries and years. For example, in Finland the 
highest score during the sample period is 80.99 in 2012, when in 2006 it is only 44.62. 
Similar results are documented from others countries as well.   
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Table 5. The average and highest ESG disclosure scores 2006-2015 (Bloomberg). 
  Finland Sweden Denmark Norway 
2006 Average 30.75 34.87 25.14 26,12 
 Highest 44.62 52.06 42.14 37.60 
2007 Average 29.19 29.42 22.75 23.49 
 Highest 49.57 58.68 47.37 48.34 
2008 Average 33.03 32.15 25.12 25.56 
 Highest 59.65 61.98 59.65 50.41 
2009 Average 36.32 34.48 30.55 27.15 
 Highest 67.11 67.11 67.10 53.72 
2010 Average 38.81 35.09 30.74 21.27 
 Highest 77.27 70.18 70.18 59.92 
2011 Average 38.81 34.84 29.50 20.80 
 Highest 77.27 67.35 58.77 63.22 
2012 Average 38.76 35.83 30.49 21.13 
 Highest 80.99 73.14 54.82 61.16 
2013 Average 40.65 35.93 29.88 22.73 
 Highest 78.15 74.38 54.82 60.74 
2014 Average 41.19 35.22 30.45 23.35 
 Highest 77.66 73.14 55.37 60.33 
2015 Average 41.32 36.18 31.28 22.83 
 Highest 67.36 71.90 55.79 60.33 
 
 
In addition, table 6 presents the sector allocation of the companies listed in Helsinki stock 
exchange during the first and the last year of the sample period. Companies are allocated 
based on the ESG disclosure information. It can be seen from the table that allocation 
between companies with ESG disclosure score has evened out during the sample period. 
This is due to a fact that companies disclosing their ecological, social and governance 
information has increased. Interestingly enough, it seems that companies in software and 
computer services rarely disclose information related to ESG factors. In addition, 
companies in industry-related sectors, such as forestry, metal and mining, are more likely 
to disclose their ESG information than other sectors. One possible reason behind the 
sector allocations is the difference in regulatory standards for different sectors. Industry-
related companies are required to disclose more ESG-related information, especially in 
the environmental part as the global warming issues are increasingly popular.  
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Table 6. Sector allocation of companies listed in Helsinki stock exchange 2006 and 2015 (Datastream,). 
  2006 2015 
Sector With score No score With score No score 
Automobiles and Parts 7.14 % 0.00 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Banks 0.00 % 1.82 % 2.13 % 1.52 % 
Beverages 0.00 % 0.91 % 0.00 % 1.52 % 
Chemicals 0.00 % 1.82 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Construction and Materials 0.00 % 4.55 % 6.38 % 6.06 % 
Electricity 7.14 % 0.00 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 0.00 % 7.27 % 4.26 % 9.09 % 
Financial Services 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 0.00 % 0.91 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Food and Drug Retailers 7.14 % 0.00 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Food Producers 0.00 % 3.64 % 6.38 % 1.52 % 
Forestry and Paper 21.43 % 1.82 % 8.51 % 1.52 % 
General Industrials 0.00 % 1.82 % 2.13 % 1.52 % 
General Retailers 0.00 % 1.82 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Health Care Equipment and Services 0.00 % 3.64 % 0.00 % 4.55 % 
Household Goods and Home Construction 0.00 % 3.64 % 2.13 % 3.03 % 
Industrial Engineering 7.14 % 13.64 % 17.02 % 10.61 % 
Industrial Metals and Mining 14.29 % 0.91 % 2.13 % 1.52 % 
Industrial Transportation 7.14 % 0.91 % 0.00 % 1.52 % 
Leisure Goods 0.00 % 1.82 % 4.26 % 0.00 % 
Media 0.00 % 6.36 % 4.26 % 4.55 % 
Mining 0.00 % 0.91 % 0.00 % 1.52 % 
Nonlife Insurance 7.14 % 0.00 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Oil and Gas Producers 0.00 % 0.91 % 2.13 % 0.00 % 
Personal Goods 0.00 % 2.73 % 2.13 % 1.52 % 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 7.14 % 0.91 % 2.13 % 1.52 % 
Real Estate Investment and Services 0.00 % 5.45 % 6.38 % 1.52 % 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.52 % 
Software and Computer Services 0.00 % 14.55 % 2.13 % 21.21 % 
Support Services 0.00 % 7.27 % 4.26 % 9.09 % 
Technology Hardware and Equipment 7.14 % 2.73 % 4.26 % 1.52 % 
Travel and Leisure 7.14 % 2.73 % 2.13 % 4.55 % 
Financial Services (Sector) 0.00 % 4.55 % 0.00 % 7.58 % 
Unclassified 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 
  100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 
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6. METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis analyses the impact of company’s ESG disclosure score on its performance. 
Methodology applied in the thesis is based on the study conducted by Schröder (2007). 
The purpose of the thesis is to determine if investing via ESG screens has an impact on 
the portfolio performance.  
 
The study is conducted by creating two equally weighted portfolios from the companies 
listed in the Helsinki stock exchange during the time period of 31.12.2006 – 14.12.2016. 
Portfolios are created using Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure score as a differentiator: 
companies with ESG disclosure score and companies without. Bloomberg updates the 
ESG disclosure score of the company after every year based on the amount of information 
disclosed by the company (Bloomberg 2017). Portfolios are rebalanced after each year 
based on the changes in companies ESG disclosure score. Benchmark index is created by 
using all the stocks listed in Helsinki stock exchange during the above mentioned time 
period.  
 
 
 6.1. Hypotheses 
 
The study is based on the assumption that companies disclosing the most information 
about the ecological, social and governance issues are more socially responsible than their 
non-disclosing counterparts.  First hypothesis is based on the impact of ESG criteria on 
company’s performance. Hypothesis is derived from the work of Girard et al. (2007) 
where they seek to measure the total cost of socially responsible investment screens. 
Girard et al. (2007) conclude that SRI funds carry a cost related to social constrains which 
is mainly related to diversification problems.  
 
H1: Using ESG disclosure score as a screen has a negative impact on portfolio 
performance. 
 
Second hypothesis continues further and compares the performance differences between 
companies with and without the ESG disclosure score. Hypothesis is based on the 
research of Renneboog et al. (2008) where they investigate the possible cost of socially 
responsible investments. The main hypothesis from the paper of Renneboog et al. (2008) 
is that investors pay a price for the usage of SRI screens by funds. This happens through 
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stock price influence caused by ethical, social, environmental and governance screens 
(Renneboog et al. 2008). 
 
H2: Companies with no ESG disclosure score outperform their socially responsible 
counterparts. 
 
Finally, the third hypothesis compares the seasonal characteristics of the two portfolios 
measuring how they perform during different market conditions. Hypothesis is related to 
the research of Nofsinger et al. (2014) where they test the effects of different market 
conditions on portfolio performance. Nofsinger et al. (2014) argue that socially 
responsible firms perform better during market turmoil due to a good governance 
standards. 
 
H3: ESG portfolio outperforms the non-ESG portfolio during market crisis period. 
 
All the three hypotheses are based on the previous research on socially responsible 
investing. However, the thesis seeks to provide contribution to the existing literature by 
using different perspectives and data. Hypotheses are tested in the results and discussion 
section.  
 
 
6.2. Portfolio performance 
 
Performance of the equally weighted portfolios is measured using the equations from 
Schröder’s (2005) paper: 
 
(5)   rp,t = αp + βp rbm,t + εi,t. 
 
The performance measures of the two portfolios are based on the Jensen’s alpha (α), 
which illustrates the excess return that is not explained by the portfolio’s exposure to risk 
with respect to the return of the benchmark index (ri). The beta coefficient is used to 
demonstrate the relative risk of the portfolio in comparison to the benchmark index 
meaning that if βp > 1, portfolio is riskier than its benchmark. (Schröder 2005) Table 7 
provides annualized returns for the two sample portfolios and for the market index. 
Evidence from the table clearly documents the effect of financial crisis periods in 2008 
and 2011. Chapter seven better explains and analyses the differences between the two 
portfolios and introduces risk measures.  
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Table 7. Annualized returns of the sample portfolios and market index 2007 – 2016 (Datastream). 
Year ESG Portfolio Non-ESG portfolio Market index 
2007 0.56 % 2.25 % 2.04 % 
2008 -51.14 % -44.11 % -46.43 % 
2009 58.19 % 48.11 % 51.73 % 
2010 30.94 % 15.05 % 20.68 % 
2011 -28.92 % -22.49 % -25.23 % 
2012 8.51 % 0.24 % 3.82 % 
2013 14.10 % 26.94 % 20.81 % 
2014 3.57 % -4.94 % -1.09 % 
2015 15.32 % 31.00 % 24.38 % 
2016 20.16 % 2.64 % 9.47 % 
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7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Results and discussion part starts with a further analysis on the performance 
characteristics of the two portfolios now including risk and performance measures. Table 
8 represents the time series characteristics of the two portfolios including annualized 
excess returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios.  
 
The Sharpe Ratio measures the excess return (ie. return above the risk-free interest rate) 
divided by the total risk of the portfolio (Schröder 2005): 
 
(6)  Sharpe ratiop = (Rp - rf) / σp,  
 
where Rp is the annualized logarithmic return of the portfolio, rf is the risk-free interest 
rate (Finland 1-year government bond yield) and σp represents the standard deviation of 
the portfolios logarithmic returns.  
 
Table 8 indicates that the average standard deviation is higher for ESG-related portfolio. 
Furthermore, the table provides evidence that the financial crisis and its aftermath created 
more volatility on ESG portfolio than in portfolio constructed from stocks without ESG 
disclosure score. However, it seems that after the financial crisis period, 2012 onwards, 
the volatilities of the portfolios has evened out or even turned the other way. One possible 
explanation behind the changes in volatility is the change in sector allocation in the 
portfolios during the sample period. Table 6 from chapter five represents the changes in 
sector allocation from 2006 to 2015. For example, the weight of forestry and paper 
industry has decreased from 21.43 % to 8.51 %. In addition, the weight in industrial 
metals and mining sector has decreased from 14.29 % to 2.13 %. This, in part, can 
influence the volatility of the portfolio due to a more even allocation between the sectors. 
During the sample period, average standard deviation of the market portfolio has varied 
between 6.867 % in 2014 and 23.925 % in 2009 averaging 15.707%.  
 
Table 8 shows that the mean excess return during the sample period is higher for the ESG 
portfolio. While this could be explained by the higher volatility of the ESG portfolio, 
Sharpe ratio is added to the table to indicate the risk adjusted returns during the sample 
period. The average annualized Sharpe ratio for the ESG portfolio is higher (0.448) 
compared to the Non-ESG portfolio (0.155) while the average Sharpe for the market 
portfolio is 0.297. As a conclusion, ESG portfolio generates better risk adjusted returns 
than market index and Non-ESG portfolio. However, further analysis is required to 
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determine if the first hypothesis, that socially responsible investments has a negative 
impact on portfolio performance, can be rejected.  
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of the sample portfolios. 
  ESG   NON-ESG  
Return St.dev Sharpe 
 
Return St.dev Sharpe 
2007 -3.397 % 13.442 % -0.253 
 
-1.707 % 14.778 % -0.116 
2008 -52.854 % 25.087 % -2.107 
 
-45.824 % 16.808 % -2.726 
2009 57.394 % 28.479 % 2.015 
 
47.314 % 22.777 % 2.077 
2010 30.337 % 17.793 % 1.705 
 
14.447 % 17.400 % 0.830 
2011 -28.855 % 16.592 % -1.739 
 
-22.425 % 15.803 % -1.419 
2012 8.384 % 18.765 % 0.447 
 
0.114 % 17.691 % 0.006 
2013 13.917 % 11.785 % 1.181 
 
26.757 % 15.206 % 1.760 
2014 3.634 % 8.154 % 0.446 
 
-4.876 % 7.039 % -0.693 
2015 15.698 % 18.835 % 0.833 
 
31.378 % 20.825 % 1.507 
2016 20.961 % 10.764 % 1.947 
 
3.437 % 10.772 % 0.319 
Average 6.522 % 16.970 % 0.448 
 
4.861 % 15.910 % 0.155 
 
 
Table 9 provides a regression-based test on the performance of the two portfolios during 
the sample period using excess return as an independent variable. The estimations are 
based on the monthly returns of the two equally weighted sample portfolios and the 
market index. Excess returns are calculated using the CAPM formula and Finnish 1-year 
government bond yield as a risk free interest rate. Table indicates that the alphas of the 
portfolios are negative but close to zero and not statistically significant. The table 
provides clear evidence that the differences in returns between the ESG portfolio and non-
ESG portfolio is explained through exposure to market risk (ie. beta). Betas for both 
portfolios are statistically significant at 1% level. Table provides evidence that the results 
from this thesis is in line with research of Schröder (2005) indicating that implementing 
ESG screens for equities do not lead to a significant outperformance or underperformance 
of the portfolio. In addition, as the alphas for the both portfolios are statistically 
insignificant, null hypotheses for both H1 and H2 can be rejected. Based on the table 9 
regression, using company’s ESG disclosure score as a screen does not have a negative 
effect on the performance of the portfolio nor does it underperform compared to its non-
disclosing counterparts. As a conclusion, table 9 provides evidence that the companies 
disclosing their ecological, social and governance issues are not overperforming or 
underperforming companies that do not disclose ESG information.  
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Table 9. Regression results on excess returns of the two sample portfolios. 
Portfolio Average return CAPM alpha (α) Beta (β) Adjusted R2 
ESG Portfolio 0.290 % -0.006 % 1.050*** 0.908 
   (-0.038) (34.204)  
Non-ESG Portfolio 0.274 % -0.001 % 0.976*** 0.960 
   (-0.012) (53.063)  
          
The t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. The significance of the results is determined on 1%, 
5% and 10% levels with ***, ** and * respectively.  
 
 
As there is no statistically significant evidence that firms disclosing ecological, social and 
governance issues will underperform, an interesting point can be made. Firms publicly 
disclosing their ESG issues are more transparent as there is more information publicly 
available to investors about the ecological, social and governance issues. Furthermore, 
transparency reduces volatility of the stock. In addition, firms leaving their ESG matters 
undisclosed may cause investors to question how these issues are handled in those firms. 
ESG matters are increasingly popular topic in the media and especially ecological issues, 
such as carbon footprints of the investment portfolios are constantly measured. Hence, 
ESG related shocks in firms will gain a substantial amount of media coverage which 
might cause a stock price to plummet. Disclosing their ESG-related information, firms 
ensure that the stock price will reflect all the ESG related information and simultaneously 
reducing the possible effect of ESG crisis. However, it is worth to remember that 
disclosing ecological issues is more important to industry-related companies than for 
companies providing software and computer services as the carbon footprint is much 
higher for the former.  
 
In addition, results from the table 9 provide evidence that restricting investment universe 
does not lead to a decrease in portfolio’s performance.  According to optimal portfolio 
theory discussed in chapter three, reducing the investment universe should lead to a 
decrease in risk-adjusted returns. Results from the table are in line with the research of 
Schröder (2007) providing evidence that investments using SRI-related screens do not 
lead to additional costs in terms of lower returns. Furthermore, similarly to Schröder 
(2007), table 9 indicates that ESG-related portfolio has a higher exposure to market 
movements than the non-ESG portfolio. 
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7.1. Market crisis  
 
The third hypothesis of the thesis is related to the performance of the two sample 
portfolios during crisis and non-crisis periods stating that firms disclosing their ESG 
criteria will perform better than their non-disclosing counterparts during market crisis. 
Crisis periods are identified using the same method as Nofsinger et al (2014) by basing 
the crisis periods in the stock market according to peak and trough of the market index 
(HEX).  
 
The first crisis period occurred during the global financial crisis from March 2007 to 
March 2009 which saw the HEX index to fall from 12 525.87 to 4 136.21, over 66 per 
cent. The second crisis period began on March 2011 and lasted until (7 561.03) May 2012 
causing the HEX index to plummet from 7 561.03 to 4 986.13 dropping over 33 per cent 
in 14 months.  
 
Figure 9 illustrates the development of HEX index during the sample period from the 
beginning of 2007 to the end of 2016. In addition, the figure demonstrates the monthly 
difference in returns of the two sample portfolios during the same time frame. It can be 
seen from the figure that the differences in returns are the highest during the first crisis 
period and in its aftermath.  One possible explanation behind the higher differences 
between the two sample portfolios is the volatility. Table 8 shows an increase in volatility 
of the ESG portfolio compared to non-ESG portfolio during the financial crisis period.  
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Table 10 contains the result from regression-based analysis on the two sample portfolios 
during the crisis and non-crisis periods. Results from the table indicate that the alphas of 
the portfolios are not statistically significant on either market scenarios. However, table 
10 provides interesting implications on the differences between alphas for the two 
portfolios. In contrast to the third hypothesis that ESG portfolios outperform non-ESG 
portfolios during the market crisis, the table provides evidence that ESG portfolios create 
positive alphas during non-crisis period and negative for the crisis period. The situation 
is the opposite for the non-ESG portfolios. Evidence from the table suggests that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected: ESG portfolio does not outperform the non-ESG portfolio 
during the market crisis period. Evidence from the thesis differs from the results of 
Nofsinger et al. (2014) where they found that SRI funds outperform conventional funds 
during the market crisis period while the opposite was true in non-crisis period. Nofsinger 
et al. (2014) state that the outperformance of the SRI funds during the market crisis is 
driven by the screens related to shareholder advocacy and ecological, social and 
governance factors. As the thesis only divides companies based on their disclosure of 
ESG-related issues, it creates an opportunity for further research by creating portfolios 
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Figure 9. The development of HEX index and differences in the returns of sample portfolios (Datastream 
2016; Bloomberg 2016). 
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with more screens to better determine how they impact on the performance of the 
portfolio.  
 
As for the previous regression, it seems that the beta explains the differences between the 
two portfolios. However, table 10 provides further evidence of the changes in beta 
coefficient. During the market crisis period, the beta is higher for the ESG portfolio while 
the opposite is true during the non-crisis period. One possible explanation behind the 
changes in beta coefficients is the sector allocation between the two portfolios. For 
example, portfolio containing companies dependent on international trade might be more 
affected by global market turmoil.   
 
 
Table 10. Regression results of the two sample portfolios in different market conditions. 
  Crisis period 
Portfolio Average return CAPM alpha (α) Beta (β) Adjusted R2 
      
ESG Portfolio -2.831 % -0.332 % 1.055*** 0.901 
   (-0.956) (34.204)  
      
Non-ESG Portfolio -2.120 % 0.163 % 0.963*** 0.973 
   (1.034) (37.077)  
          
  Non-crisis period 
      
ESG Portfolio 1.906 % 0.219 % 1.001*** 0.885 
   (1.177) (24.709)  
      
Non-ESG Portfolio 1.540 % -0.144 % 1.007*** 0.942 
   (-1.122) (35.837)  
          
The t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. The significance of the results is determined on 1%, 
5% and 10% levels with ***, ** and * respectively.  
 
 
In their research, Nofsinger et al. (2014) conclude that during crisis period, positive alphas 
for SRI funds are generated through positive screens rather than negative. Furthermore, 
Nofsinger et al. (2014) state that SRI funds differ from conventional funds also in 
company characteristics: SRI funds tend to hold more companies that are younger, 
smaller, more profitable and with lower return volatility. As the thesis differentiates 
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companies of the two portfolios only through sector allocation and ESG disclosure score, 
this opens an opportunity for further research about other company characteristics.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The concept of socially responsible investing has increased drastically over the past 
decade creating a demand for funds implementing different SRI strategies. In the United 
States, assets under management almost doubled in value in a two-year time-period from 
2012 to 2014, totaling $ 6.57 trillion (USSIF 2014). Despite the growing popularity of 
socially responsible investment strategies, existing research is ambiguous over the 
performance of SRI funds. Several studies suggest that investing responsibly creates an 
additional cost for investors through underperformance (Adler et al. 2008; Renneboog et 
al. 2008). Rapid growth of SRI funds and documented underperformance of SRI 
strategies raises an interesting point: if socially responsible funds underperform, then why 
is it becoming increasingly popular amongst individual investors? However, as stated 
earlier, the research around performance measures of SRI-related investing varies 
significantly. The main motivation behind the thesis is to contribute to the existing 
literature of socially responsible investing by offering a fresh perspective by introducing 
ESG disclosure score as a new investment screen. 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the effect of company’s ESG disclosure score 
on portfolio performance using data from Finnish stock market. The study is conducted 
by examining the returns of two equally weighted sample portfolios. Portfolios are 
constructed by dividing stocks listed in the Helsinki stock exchange by its ESG disclosure 
score provided by Bloomberg. The study seeks to determine if either of the portfolios are 
able to create abnormal returns during the time period of 2007 to 2016. Additionally, the 
performance of the portfolios is also tested against different market conditions by dividing 
the sample period into crisis and non-crisis periods.  
 
Results from the study suggests that alphas for both of the portfolios are negative, close 
to zero and statistically insignificant. Results provide evidence that the performance 
differences between the portfolios are explained by beta, ie. exposure to market risk. 
Furthermore, the beta was higher (1.05) for the ESG portfolio suggesting that companies 
with ESG disclosure score are more volatile than the ones without (0.976). One possible 
reason explaining the difference in beta coefficients is the sector allocation of the two 
portfolios. During the early stages of the sample period, the sector allocation was more 
evenly distributed in non-ESG portfolio than ESG portfolio.  Results from the regression 
analysis indicate that the thesis contributes to the existing literature by stating that 
implementing ESG screens do not lead to a significant over or underperformance. In 
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addition, based on the performance results, it is possible to conclude that investors do not 
have to pay additional cost for using the ESG disclosure score as an investment screen.  
 
Results can be beneficial also from the firm’s perspective. As disclosing company’s 
ecological, social and governance information does not lead to a significant 
underperformance, it is possible for firms to disclose as much information as possible to 
increase transparency. In fact, number of companies disclosing ESG-related information 
has increased steadily over the sample period. In 2006, only 16 per cent of the companies 
disclosed some of the ESG information and by the end of 2015, the same number was 
44.7 per cent. This highlights the increasing popularity of ESG matters amongst 
companies. Furthermore, as the investors are slowly taking into account the climate risk 
by following the carbon footprint of their investments, it is likely that companies will 
increase the disclosure of environmental information as it is more accurately followed. 
 
Sample portfolio were also tested against different market conditions by dividing the 
sample period into crisis and non-crisis periods. Evidence from the thesis suggests that 
ESG portfolio generates positive alpha during the non-crisis period and negative during 
the crisis period while the opposite is true for non-ESG portfolio. This leads to a 
conclusion that non-ESG portfolio includes more defensive stocks than the ESG 
portfolio. The study provides possibilities for further research of other firm characteristics 
between the portfolios for example size and price to book ratios needed in the Fama-
French three-factor model. Additionally, as the sample period of 2006 – 2016 is relatively 
short due to a fact that the ESG disclosure score is a new concept, the study could be 
repeated in the future for lengthier time period to better capture the results.  
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